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Abstract
Do populist leaders contribute to the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)? While all governments 
have struggled to respond to the pandemic, it is now becoming clear that some political leaders have performed 
much better than others. Among the worst performing are those that have risen to power on populist agendas, 
such as in the United States, Brazil, Russia, India, and the United Kingdom. Populist leaders have tended to: blame 
“others” for the pandemic, such as immigrants and the Chinese government; deny evidence and show contempt for 
institutions that generate it; and portray themselves as the voice of the common people against an out-of-touch ‘elite.’ 
In our short commentary, focusing on those countries with the most cases, we find that populist leaders appear to 
be undermining an effective response to COVID-19. Perversely, they may also gain politically from doing so, as 
historically populist leaders benefit from suffering and ill health. Clearly more research is needed on the curious 
correlation of populism and public health. Notwithstanding gaps in the evidence, health professionals have a duty to 
speak out against these practices to prevent avoidable loss of life.
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Introduction
In the accompanying paper, Rinaldi and Bekker review 
evidence that the ideology pursued by populist radical right 
parties in Europe is harmful for health.1 Their analysis builds 
on a small but growing body of literature on what has been 
described as the political determinants of health.2,3 The 
decisions that politicians make shapes the conditions in 
which people live and the choices, many with consequences 
for the health, that are available to them. This is crucial 
during disease outbreaks, like the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) pandemic, which requires politicians to set 
aside ideology and act on a rapidly emerging and uncertain 
body of public-health evidence. 
Here we extend the important work of Rinaldi and Bekker to 
ask, are populist leaders creating conditions which contribute 
to the spread of COVID-19?
Before doing so, we first note that the COVID-19 pandemic 
is unique in recent times in generating broadly comparable 
data (albeit far from perfect) in every country in the world 
with a delay of days or weeks at most. Historically, publication 
of health data, if it takes place at all, is often long delayed and, 
in many cases, lacking the granularity necessary to provide 
a detailed assessment of how countries are performing in 
improving the health of their populations. This means that 
the health consequences of policies only become apparent 
long after the decisions that gave rise to them. Now, measures 
of health are leading the news. Heads of government in many 
countries are appearing, in some cases daily, to share the news 
on the progress of the pandemic with their people. Anyone can 
go to the Johns Hopkins website to track, in almost real time, 
numbers of cases and deaths.4 A leading global newspaper, 
the Financial Times, has become a key source of information 
on comparative COVID-19 data, discussing their strengths 
and weaknesses.5 These data make it possible for politicians 
to be held to account for the ability to protect the health of 
their populations in almost real time, in marked contrast to 
the situation described above when the consequences of their 
decisions for health are only seen years later. 
There appears to be a striking correlation between 
countries led by politicians who support populist messages 
and the poor performance in responding to COVID-19. As 
of June 25, 2020, the United States, Brazil, Russia, India, and 
the United Kingdom occupied, in that order, the top five 
positions ranked by numbers of COVID-19 cases in the Johns 
Hopkins dashboard. Together, they account for 51% of all 
cases worldwide but only 27% of the world’s population. 
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There are four potential mechanisms for such a link between 
populism and COVID-19 spread. We take each in turn.
Mechanism 1: Blaming Outsiders and Victims
Rinaldi and Bekker examine the populist radical right, with its 
combination of nativism (a policy of protecting the interests 
of persons born in a state against those of immigrants) and 
authoritarianism (a policy favouring strict obedience to 
authority over personal freedoms). This is logical given the 
authors’ focus on welfare policy and health. However, when 
seeking to understand responses to COVID-19 we believe 
that it is appropriate to look at populism even more broadly. 
In this respect, we additionally consider one mechanism 
linked to a definition of populism proposed by Albertazzi 
and McDonnell, who see it as an ideology that “pits a 
virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and 
dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or 
attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, 
values, prosperity, identity, and voice.”6 This definition brings 
together populist politicians on the left, such as Venezuela’s 
Nicolás Maduro, with those on the right, such as Brazil’s 
Jair Bolsanaro, as well as those whose politics are influenced 
heavily by nationalism or religion, such as Turkey’s Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan or India’s Narendra Modi. Others adopting 
populist approaches include America’s Donald Trump, 
Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and the UK’s Boris Johnson.
The populist approach that these politicians have adopted 
has involved appealing to groups in society that have been left 
behind,2 for various reasons including the consequences of 
loss of traditional industries and who have struggled to adapt 
to changing circumstances, often because of a lack of the 
necessary skills. Understandably, these groups have sought 
someone to blame for the misfortune. Populist leaders have 
seized upon their disaffection, developing a narrative in which 
their misfortunes are due to the actions of others. These are 
often those who are identifiably different, for example because 
of their dress or the colour of their skin. Thus, Donald Trump 
explicitly invoked COVID-19 as a justification for increasing 
restrictions on workers coming from abroad.7 The populist 
narrative continues by developing a worldview in which the 
circumstances that have allowed people to be left behind 
have been created by a remote and unfeeling elite. Into this 
situation, the strong leader emerges as the saviour of his (and 
almost always it is his rather than her) people. 
This ‘insider-outsider’ narrative has served populist 
politicians well, attracting the votes of those who feel they 
have been left behind.8,9 The populist politician offers hope of 
a better future. It matters little that they often fail to deliver. 
Any failure is always someone else’s fault, and particularly 
those from the “other” group or the elite that protects them. 
The difficulty arises when the threat is not from the “other” 
group but, as with COVID-19, it is from a microorganism. Just 
as, to employ a widely used cliché, viruses pay no attention to 
national borders, nor do they have passports or citizenship. Of 
course, this did not prevent President Trump from blaming 
the Chinese, or ‘Kung Flu’ virus, or Hindu nationalists from 
blaming Muslims. 
Mechanism 2: Contempt for Institutions
When the history of the COVID-19 pandemic is written, 
it will be possible to identify many individual decisions by 
politicians that influenced its course. Among them, and 
likely the most important, will be the timing of the decision 
to impose restrictions on movement. Others will include 
choices about how and when to implement testing and 
tracing strategies, how messages were communicated, and 
how the material necessary to respond to the pandemic was 
procured. However, underlying all of these we can identify 
two characteristics of populism that have contributed to the 
situation in which all of these countries have done especially 
badly during the pandemic. 
The first is a contempt for the traditional institutions that 
are populated by the elites, sometimes described as “enemies 
of the people.”10 Populist leaders are reluctant to be bound by 
institutional constraints, such as constitutions and courts. 
By switching between being president and prime minister, 
Vladimir Putin has managed to circumvent the constitutional 
restriction on terms of office. Boris Johnson was found to have 
prorogued Parliament illegally. Jair Bolsonaro has spoken of 
his desire to abolish the Supreme Court. It is, however, their 
approach to public health institutions that are particularly 
important here. These are characterised by a combination of 
neglect, denying necessary funding or leaving key positions 
unfilled, or hostility. Thus, three months before the emergence 
of COVID-19, the Trump administration closed down the 
USAID funded PREDICT programme, developed to provide 
early warning of possible pandemics.11 In the UK the cabinet’s 
Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingency Committee 
was axed by Boris Johnson a few days after assuming office.12 
Jair Bolsanaro fired two health ministers within weeks.13 In 
2017 Narendra Modi cut the planned budget of the National 
Health Mission, India’s public health service, by 20%.14 
Donald Trump attempted to impose similar cuts on the 
Centers for Disease Control but was blocked by Congress.15 
The organisation did, however, have to reduce substantially 
its outpost in Beijing, established to provide information 
on emerging viruses. The situation in Turkey was different. 
There, the health system was weakened by Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s dismissal of tens of thousands of civil servants, 
including leading virologists, following an attempted coup.16 
In Venezuela the loss of institutional capacity was a result of 
economic collapse due to mismanagement.17
Mechanisms 3: Denialism
The third, and related issue is rejection of evidence. Just as they 
are reluctant to be constrained by institutions and their rules, 
so they reject the laws of science, discovered and promoted 
by the elites, and their consequences. Rather, they adopted 
the tactics associated with denialism, including promotion 
of conspiracy theories, cherry picking evidence, citing false 
experts, moving goalposts, and employing a range of logical 
fallacies.18 
Even though the rapid growth of the pandemic was apparent 
from early on, populist politicians were in denial about 
its potential effect on their countries. In early March 2020, 
Boris Johnson advised the public that “we should all basically 
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just go about our normal daily lives’’ providing they washed 
their hands frequently, and boasted of shaking hands with 
infected patients.19 Later in March, Jair Bolsanaro described 
the pandemic, which by then had accounted for less than 
20 000 deaths worldwide, as a “media trick.”20 Many populist 
politicians have promoted treatments lacking any evidential 
basis, most notably Hydroxychloroquine, in a possibly unique 
example of agreement Donald Trump and Nicolás Maduro.21 
While there is a wealth of evidence that consideration of 
all the evidence leads to better decisions, populist politicians 
reject anything that challenges their beliefs. Hence, when the 
director of the US health department’s Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority challenged Trump’s 
support for hydroxychloroquine he was fired.22 Of course, faced 
with a situation they cannot control, it is understandable that 
populist politicians, used to spreading positive messages, will 
clutch at straws. Maduro had previously advocated drinking 
tea made from lemongrass and elderberry tea.21 However, in 
Trump’s case, it has become impossible to ascertain whether 
his increasingly bizarre statements reflect a deliberate attempt 
to create hope of a cure or whether they simply reflect his 
profound ignorance of basic science, as when he commented 
that the coronavirus “has gotten so brilliant that the antibiotic 
cannot keep up with it.”23 
The prominent cases of populist leaders mismanaging the 
crisis described above is consistent with a recent quantitative 
study on political leaders’ responses to the COVID-19 
pandemic in 94 countries from around the world.24 The results 
of this analysis suggest that governments headed by populist 
leaders delivered a weaker response to COVID-19 than non-
populist ones by implementing fewer closures and less robust 
health countermeasures during the onset of the crisis. Thus it 
would seem that the consequences of apparently idiosyncratic 
circumstances associated with populism for the spread of 
COVID-19 in three of the worst affected countries, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Brazil, are representative of 
the broader developments in the world, especially considering 
that in that multi-country study the results are adjusted for 
countries’ economic capacity, demographic composition, 
earlier experience with pandemics such as severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS), the level of democracy, and 
time elapsed since discovery of a country’s first confirmed 
COVID-19 case. 
Mechanism 4: Suspicion of Elites
While perhaps less direct than the key mechanisms 
highlighted above, it is also important to highlight the 
intersections between populist rhetoric, the media, and 
COVID-19. Populist politicians commonly position the 
media—particularly outlets that criticize their policies or 
messaging—as members of the ‘corrupt elite,’25 or the “enemy 
of the people,” in the case of Donald Trump. Yet, during a 
pandemic, experts must rely heavily on mainstream media 
platforms to generate public health awareness and articulate 
the steps that must be taken to mitigate risk. 
This dynamic creates an insidious pathway through which 
populism may facilitate the spread of COVID-19. One recent 
study found that consumption of Fox News, a decidedly pro-
Trump network, reduced propensity to comply with physical 
distancing measures across Zip codes in the United States.26 
Another study found that obtaining news from mainstream 
broadcast media, such as NBC News and the New York 
Times, correlated with possessing accurate information about 
the disease’s lethality, and accurate beliefs about protection 
from infection. The study also found an association between 
watching Fox News and support for conspiracy theories, such 
as believing that the CDC is exaggerating the seriousness of 
COVID-19 to undermine the presidency of Donald Trump.27 
Reverse Causality: Suffering and Ill Health From COVID-19 
Increasing Support for Populism
So far, we have considered the impact of populist politics on 
COVID-19, describing how it has inhibited the development 
of effective responses to the pandemic. But what about the 
impact of COVID-19 on populism? Will those who once 
supported these populist politicians turn against them as they 
see their friends and families die prematurely? The United 
States offers an opportunity to find out. Between March and 
the latest data, as of writing this paper, there was a sustained 
fall in cases in states and counties that voted for Clinton in 
2016 while the reverse happened in those that had voted for 
Trump.28 Trump’s poll ratings have been falling but he still 
retains considerable support among his core vote. This may 
be explained, at least so far, by the cognitive biases that shape 
how people interpret news, itself related to the news channels 
they view. Thus, in late February 2020, early in the pandemic, 
40% of Republicans were “not concerned at all” about a 
coronavirus outbreak in their communities, falling to 25% in 
mid March. In contrast, among Democrats the figure started 
at just over 5%, falling even further over the same period.29 
This gap was corroborated by other data, including evidence 
that those living in Democrat supporting areas were more 
likely to search online for hand sanitizers.
COVID-19 may also shape the underlying forces that 
precede and correlate with populist sentiments and support. 
First, in addition to the devasting effects on population 
health, the pandemic has also precipitated an economic 
crisis. One recent well-publicized study found crisis-driven 
unemployment to be a substantial driver of political distrust 
and the subsequent rise in populist electoral support across 
Europe.30 Second, COVID-19 is intensifying the spread of 
online disinformation,27,31 which may further erode trust in 
experts and mainstream institutions, fuelling support for anti-
establishment and populist narratives. Third, consistent with 
historical linkages between epidemic threats and xenophobia,32 
emerging evidence suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic 
has triggered anti-Asian and anti-immigrant sentiments,33,34 
views that align with populist rhetoric promising to protect a 
pure and (ethnically) homogenous people. 
Although we will not know the actual implications of the 
pandemic for populist political parties and their leaders for 
some time, until votes in the next rounds of elections are 
counted, and these ramifications will be likely shaped by the 
human toll and the length of the pandemic, past experience 
suggest that some of the most memorable electoral upsets such 
as the 1930s’ rise of the Nazi Party in Germany,35 the election of 
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Trump in the United States,8 and the Brexit referendum in the 
United Kingdom,9 were preceded by deteriorating population 
health. It is also clear that in the European countries in 
which populist parties until now played on a marginal role, 
radical right-wing groups are attempting to reap the benefits 
from COVID-19 by blaming, for instance, immigrants for 
spreading the virus in care homes in Sweden,36 smearing the 
idea of European solidarity in Italy,37 or in France promoting 
the narrative that Chinese scientists deliberately bred the 
virus in laboratory.38
In sum, we are likely seeing the earliest evidence of a 
worrisome cycle: populism fuelling the spread of COVID-19, 
and, in turn, COVID-19 stoking the fires of populism. 
Despite better public health data being available, more 
rapidly than ever before, in a climate where lies and 
disinformation are the new norm,39 we will need to develop 
strategies that can hold politicians to account for the health 
of the public. In democracies, this is achieved through 
the democratic process, but even in these countries this 
depends on voters being able to obtain fair and accurate 
information, which can be difficult where powerful vested 
interests dominate the mass media and if disinformation is 
disseminated widely on social media. The problem is much 
greater in non- or quasi-democratic states, where there are 
no free and fair elections and where those who speak out risk 
their careers or even their lives. In all of these circumstances, 
health professionals have a role to play, although it will vary 
according to circumstances. It places a great responsibility on 
those who can speak out, especially those in universities, who 
can be both advocates themselves and ensure that advocacy 
for health is included in undergraduate and postgraduate 
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